A very frank interview with Nazri Aziz. He gave an insight to people outside of UMNO on the money politics within the party, and he even mentioned his prefered candidate for the deputy presidency.
Before this interview, I saw Nazri Aziz as someone who is very much like other UMNO ministers; corrupt, arrogant, and being in the party just to serve his self-interest.
However, this interview gave me a totally different perspective on him. He came out as someone who is against money politics and corrupt practices, and willing serve the rakyat before all else.
Datuk Seri Nazri Aziz who opted not to contest the Umno elections this time shares his views on many aspects of the party which he says is still in denial.
In a frank interview, Datuk Seri Nazri Aziz, the minister in charge of law, talks about why he is not taking part in the upcoming party elections, his support for certain candidates, and the need for members to go back to the days when Umno was people-friendly.
He also says money politics in Umno has gone underground and he is not confident that delegates will pick the right candidates for the top posts.
A. How is money politics in the Umno elections this time around?
Q. It’s still quite rampant except that it has gone underground. That is the reason we hear a lot of things about the exchange of money but nothing comes out of it. The MACC (Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission) is empowered to look into all complaints made by Umno members but, as mentioned by the MACC Chief Commissioner, though there were many complaints, what is clear is there is no strong evidence because, as I said, it has gone underground and people are not coming out to say it.
Why do you think members have gone to the MACC rather than the Umno disciplinary board?
As far as I am concerned, it only shows that things are getting worse. There are two reasons members are taking it up to the MACC. One is probably their frustration over money politics in Umno and nothing is done. With the MACC Act recently passed, members are aware of the Act and feel action needs to be taken now so they go straight to the MACC. Actually, a corrupt act cannot be settled at the party disciplinary board level as it is not an offence just against Umno that can be sorted out internally. It goes beyond Umno. It is an offence against the state so nothing can stop MACC from coming in because all these complaints are made by Umno members.
The second reason is that people easily make complaints to MACC to have a second bite if they lose.
Does this mean that the disciplinary board is not effective?
It’s just that under the old law, some things were not an offence. Corruption has been described as a person in power being induced by monetary consideration to make decisions in favour of the giver; but in Umno, a delegate has got no power. And corruption was confined to the exchange of money only and that is why many got away with it (money politics). For example, if I am a candidate for the party elections and I pay your fare to Sabah to go campaigning with me, is that corruption? Before, it was not a corrupt act. But now with the new MACC Act, things are different and they can investigate. Any action that can influence the results of the party elections can be considered as corruption. If I win the elections without giving out money, but six months later I bring the Umno delegates for a holiday, that too can be deemed corruption. MACC has wider powers now to look into all this.
But surely delegates who come to meet candidates expect to be reimbursed for their petrol, food and hotel expenses?
MACC will know. If the money comes from the Umno division, that’s okay. But if the money comes from somebody else or a contestant – itu tak boleh lah (that cannot be allowed). If candidates want to introduce themselves, they should go down to those places and pay for themselves. Strictly speaking, no money should be exchanged.
Sabah is a big place, so if you are in Kota Kinabalu and want to meet delegates from Tawau and you reimburse them for their transport, how?
That’s money politics. It’s not even a meeting, why do you call them to come and see you? If they were to come with their own money, that’s okay. If you want to meet people, for example, in Tawau then you should be the one to go there (not pay them to come and see you).
Why have you chosen to stay out of Umno elections this time?
Because I have been given the responsibility of tabling the MACC Bill and there is such a thing as integrity. How can I table this if I myself get involved in a contest in which I foresee there is going to be a lot of money politics? Though I may not bribe, my participation in a contest that involves a lot of money politics will in a way be questioned by others.
It’s all about integrity. If I want people to have confidence in the MACC, I want to make sure that I will not do anything that can make people question my integrity as minister in charge of anti-corruption. How can I make a statement in parliament about money politics in Umno raised by MPs if I myself am involved in a contest which involves a lot of money politics? They won’t have confidence. So I have to make sure that there shouldn’t be any doubt at all about the seriousness of the Government in wanting to fight corruption, including in Umno.
Does this mean if you continue to hold the de facto law minister portfolio, you will not contest any other party election?
I am a minister. The post of minister is more important than the party post. Holding a party post will not enable me to contribute to the general public but as a minister I can. A minister should not necessarily be holding an important post in the party.
But you made the decision not to contest party polls even before Datuk Zaid Ibrahim resigned as de facto law minister.
I decided not to contest for many reasons. I have been in the Supreme Council for about 19 years. I first contested in 1990 and won. Don’t tell me 19 years later, I still want to compete for the same post with others who, during my first term in the Supreme Council in 1990, were still in school. The same argument goes for the vice-presidency (veep). It would mean I am competing against my juniors –(Datuk) Zahid (Hamidi), (Datuk Seri) Hishammuddin Hussein, (Datuk) Shafie Apdal, (Datuk Seri) Khaled (Nordin) – these are all my juniors so I don’t want to compete with my juniors.
I am also a person who would go for the post only if I feel I am better than everyone else (contesting). When (Datuk Seri) Najib Tun Razak was Youth chief, I was his deputy so that’s also the reason I don’t go for veep. The post I would have gone for is deputy president. But I chose not to because I see in (Tan Sri) Muhyiddin Yassin someone who is more experienced than me, older than me and more senior than me.
I have been in the Cabinet for 10 years but he’s been there for 23 years. I look at his resume and credentials and feel that this man is much more qualified than I am so why should I go for the post? Muhyiddin is capable. If I still go for the post – despite Muhyiddin being better qualified – it means I am only interested in myself. But I am more concerned about the party. I want the party to be strong. Najib is now president-elect of Umno and Prime Minister-in-waiting and I want the deputy to be a man of experience who can give support to Najib and confidence to the general public and strengthen Umno. If people look at a Najib-Muhyiddin combination, they are confident. That’s what I want. It’s not about me. That’s why I didn’t go for the post.
There are two other candidates (Tan Sri Muhammad Muhammad Taib aka Mat Taib and Datuk Seri Mohd Ali Rustam) standing for the deputy post and you did not even mention them?
First of all, I cannot support them, not for personal reasons but for real, practical reasons. The deputy Prime Minister will succeed the Prime Minister. We can’t discount the fact that anything can happen and if anything happens to the PM, the deputy PM will take over. For Ali (Rustam) and Mat Taib to take over, it is not possible and is unconstitutional because they are not even MPs.
But it is possible to have a by-election and allow them to contest a parliament seat.
Is that necessary? It’s messy. And what experience do they have to be number two? As a Cabinet minister, I have not seen Ali in Cabinet. The last time he was in the Federal government, he was a deputy minister. So how is he to command respect from the other Umno Cabinet ministers when he himself is a rookie in Cabinet? There are many other Umno Cabinet members who will be his senior. How can he command respect? These are practical reasons.
For Mat Taib too, whatever you say he is still a junior minister. How does he command respect if he becomes Deputy Prime Minister? Not just with Umno but also the other Barisan cabinet ministers too! How can, for example, Datuk Bernard Dompok from a small component party in Sabah respect them? But Muhyiddin has 23 years, so for practical reasons I can’t support the other two. I am a senior in Cabinet and these two are my juniors if they come to Cabinet. It’s not like I don’t like them personally or anything like that. It’s just for practical reasons.
The March 8 general election was an eye opener as Umno suffered from the loss of support. Why have Umno members not realised this and tried to bring the party back on track instead of engaging in money politics?
Because Umno members go into politics for self-gain and self-interest! They are assuming that the party will never lose! They do not see what happened as a warning of what is to come in the future. They think the public has regretted their decision (to vote the Opposition) and Barisan will get back the support. They think it’s temporary and that elections are like a pendulum that will swing back in their favour, and that we win big in one election and we lose a bit in the next. They say in the 1986 general election the pendulum was on our side and we won big; in 1990 we did badly because of Semangat 46; in1995 we won big again and in 1999 we suffered and lost Terengganu; in 2004 we won big. For them, the 2008 election was a pendulum, so they think they can just sit down and not work because they assume the pendulum will swing back to us in the next election.
Are they right?
Of course they are wrong. We have to work and be people friendly. Umno members must go back to the days when Umno was people friendly. Ikut rasmi padi lagi berisi lagi tunduk (The more you have, the more humble you are). But what we see today is that when you become minister or hold a post, you are behaving like warlords and not people friendly at all. Mana boleh (how can that be)? We have to change. We must accept reality that we can’t behave in the way we behaved in the 60s and 70s when we could shout and say anything and the public still accepted us. It’s different now with the Internet. Whatever you say, people will come to know straightaway. So you have to behave yourself. The public are more demanding now, and rightly so.
Another mistake Umno is making is telling the people they must be grateful for what the Barisan government has done for them. That is wrong. What we do for the rakyat, we are duty bound to do. Because when we stood for election, we said ‘you elect me and I’ll do this, this and this.’ So they delivered their part by electing me and I have to do what I promised the rakyat. I can’t turn around and say ‘rakyat, you must be grateful to me.’ I can’t lecture them on that because it was I who made the promise.
It’s been a year since the March 8 general election. Has there been some effort to repair Umno in particular?
I think there’ll be a change when Najib takes over. Right now, we are still in denial. We all talk about how we have to change but it’s only talk. I have not seen any concrete effort.
Does this election make you more pessimistic?
If we don’t change. I don’t like the number 13 (13th general election ). The RAHMAN theory is coming to an end, isn’t it? We are coming to the last of the R-A-H-M-A-N Prime Ministers. After that we don’t know. We have to work hard.
As someone who is not contesting, what is your advice to the delegates?
Like Tun Musa (Hitam) said, my advice too is whatever you do, whom you vote, you must not think of just what Umno wants. You must think of what the rakyat wants and then vote. Umno equals the Government so it can’t be just electing a person based on what Umno wants. It must elect a person whom the general public wants and feels confident with.
Are you confident that this time around the delegates would do it?
I hear a lot. So I am not confident. I hear the questions asked when candidates go campaigning. For example, when Muhyiddin goes down, they ask ‘why does he not smile?’ Is that a reason to vote or not vote someone? They ask ‘why don’t you give me a project when you are a minister?’ Is that a reason for you to vote your leader? Or they say ‘other candidates have given me this but you have not given me anything so why should I vote for you?’ Is that a reason not to elect a person? Because of his face? Because he doesn’t smile? Or they say ‘my birthday was yesterday and this other candidate called me up but you didn’t bother to say happy birthday to me’ or that ‘I was in hospital and why didn’t you visit me. The others came.’
So if you look at all this, do you have confidence? I don’t!
And we are not even talking about money yet. Money is another matter.
I am talking about the mindset of the delegates and how they vote their leaders. You are an outsider and I am revealing to you how the delegates’ mindset works. Do you want a leader who first thing in the morning is at his desk – not doing his work – but looking through the birthdays of the 2,000 delegates to see whom to call to wish ‘Happy birthday’?
That’s quite a scary scenario.
Now you know why I don’t participate.
This is the first time in years that the number two post is being contested. Does it make a difference in the party elections?
Of course. Tradition in the past has been that when the Prime Minister or Umno president dies or resigns midstream, the new Prime Minister can then determine the Deputy Prime Minister without first having to go through the party elections; and when it comes to party elections it’s fait accompli – the Deputy Prime Minister becomes deputy president. That’s what happened with Najib, Pak Lah (Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi) and Tun Dr Mahathir (Mohamad). They became Deputy Prime Minister first and then deputy president. This is a very good tradition. There shouldn’t be a fight because the number two is one day going to become number one. It is unfortunate this time around that it is bucking the trend. That is why you find us with the problem we are facing now.
Surely there are others in Umno who are also capable to be number two?
There are. For example, if you say I am capable, I don’t want to. For (Datuk Seri) Rais Yatim, he chose not to because the (deputy) post is too important. Same with (Datuk Seri) Syed Hamid Albar. Although they are capable, they only chose to go for the vice-presidency. It’s not that there are no others capable but these are all thinking Umno members so they didn’t want a fight (for the number two).
Sunday, March 8, 2009
Thursday, February 5, 2009
Malaysian politics: what do I think?
Pros
UMNO - Proven leadership. Provided stability in Malaysia for many years. Good administrator.
MCA - Willing partner to UMNO. Supports UMNO in governing Malaysia. Good administrator.
MIC - Supports UMNO in governing Malaysia.
PKR - Their values and objectives could stand the stress test in any democracy around the world. The most multi-racial party in Malaysia.
PAS - Their Islamic values give makes them a principally strong party. Strong ground level organisation.
DAP - Similar to PKR, their values could stand the stress test in any democracy.
Cons
UMNO - Too corrupt. The party is too extreme in its Malay agenda, alienating their partners in BN.
MCA - A lot of infighting lead to split leadership.
MIC - Weak leadership. Laughing stock of Malaysian politics.
PKR - Anwar Ibrahim is too arrogant in pursuing power. Weak ground level organisation.
PAS - Weak administrator. Division between moderates and Islamists. Too Malay.
DAP - Lack of Malay support. Too Chinese.
UMNO - Proven leadership. Provided stability in Malaysia for many years. Good administrator.
MCA - Willing partner to UMNO. Supports UMNO in governing Malaysia. Good administrator.
MIC - Supports UMNO in governing Malaysia.
PKR - Their values and objectives could stand the stress test in any democracy around the world. The most multi-racial party in Malaysia.
PAS - Their Islamic values give makes them a principally strong party. Strong ground level organisation.
DAP - Similar to PKR, their values could stand the stress test in any democracy.
Cons
UMNO - Too corrupt. The party is too extreme in its Malay agenda, alienating their partners in BN.
MCA - A lot of infighting lead to split leadership.
MIC - Weak leadership. Laughing stock of Malaysian politics.
PKR - Anwar Ibrahim is too arrogant in pursuing power. Weak ground level organisation.
PAS - Weak administrator. Division between moderates and Islamists. Too Malay.
DAP - Lack of Malay support. Too Chinese.
Thursday, December 18, 2008
Cleaning Up Malaysia
From The Wall Street Journal Asia, 18 December 2008
In the era of Blagojevich, Illinois isn't the only place considering how better to deal with political corruption. This week Malaysia passed its most aggressive anticorruption legislation in a decade as well as a bill that aims to protect judicial independence.
These steps are worth applauding, but they're a far cry from the reforms that Malaysia needs. Like many young democracies, Malaysia lacks the full separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches that lies at the core of successful democracies. Until these branches of government can act as checks and balances against each other, band-aid reforms will make little difference.
A case in point is the Judicial Appointments Commission Bill, proposed by Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, which parliament passed yesterday. High-profile scandals -- including a videotape released last year that purports to show an attorney brokering judicial appointments with a top judge -- have eroded trust in the judiciary. The bill's purpose is to "provide a more transparent mechanism in the process of appointments and promotions of senior judges," a government spokesperson told us by telephone.
Yet the legislation still gives the prime minister sole power to appoint all senior judges in the nation's three highest courts. The bill creates a body, the Judicial Appointments Commission, that makes recommendations to the PM, but he is free to reject them, ask for more recommendations or appoint someone else entirely. The PM also appoints the majority of the members of the commission.
The other side of Mr. Abdullah's reform plan is the Anti-Corruption Commission Bill, which was passed on Tuesday. The bill upgrades Malaysia's anticorruption watchdog from an agency to a commission, and greatly increases the scope of its mandate, including, for example, the power to investigate relatives of corrupt officials. Mr. Abdullah said last month that the staff of the commission would be increased to 5,000 over the next five years.
But the catch is that the commission is still tied to Malaysia's political establishment. Its members are appointed by the prime minister, with royal approval, and the commission must obtain approval from the Attorney General or someone approved by the AG before conducting certain types of investigations. The PM also appoints, with royal approval, all members of the advisory board that oversees the commission.
Mr. Abdullah is expected to step down in March, and he has made judicial reform and anticorruption efforts high priorities during his last months in office. Bravo to him for drawing public attention to the problems. It will be up to a successor to establish the full separation of powers that Malaysia's democracy needs.
In the era of Blagojevich, Illinois isn't the only place considering how better to deal with political corruption. This week Malaysia passed its most aggressive anticorruption legislation in a decade as well as a bill that aims to protect judicial independence.
These steps are worth applauding, but they're a far cry from the reforms that Malaysia needs. Like many young democracies, Malaysia lacks the full separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial branches that lies at the core of successful democracies. Until these branches of government can act as checks and balances against each other, band-aid reforms will make little difference.
A case in point is the Judicial Appointments Commission Bill, proposed by Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi, which parliament passed yesterday. High-profile scandals -- including a videotape released last year that purports to show an attorney brokering judicial appointments with a top judge -- have eroded trust in the judiciary. The bill's purpose is to "provide a more transparent mechanism in the process of appointments and promotions of senior judges," a government spokesperson told us by telephone.
Yet the legislation still gives the prime minister sole power to appoint all senior judges in the nation's three highest courts. The bill creates a body, the Judicial Appointments Commission, that makes recommendations to the PM, but he is free to reject them, ask for more recommendations or appoint someone else entirely. The PM also appoints the majority of the members of the commission.
The other side of Mr. Abdullah's reform plan is the Anti-Corruption Commission Bill, which was passed on Tuesday. The bill upgrades Malaysia's anticorruption watchdog from an agency to a commission, and greatly increases the scope of its mandate, including, for example, the power to investigate relatives of corrupt officials. Mr. Abdullah said last month that the staff of the commission would be increased to 5,000 over the next five years.
But the catch is that the commission is still tied to Malaysia's political establishment. Its members are appointed by the prime minister, with royal approval, and the commission must obtain approval from the Attorney General or someone approved by the AG before conducting certain types of investigations. The PM also appoints, with royal approval, all members of the advisory board that oversees the commission.
Mr. Abdullah is expected to step down in March, and he has made judicial reform and anticorruption efforts high priorities during his last months in office. Bravo to him for drawing public attention to the problems. It will be up to a successor to establish the full separation of powers that Malaysia's democracy needs.
Tuesday, December 16, 2008
The Charade of Meritocracy by Michael D. Barr
The Charade Of Meritocracy
October 2006
By Michael D. Barr
The legitimacy of the Singaporean government is predicated on the idea of a meritocratic technocracy. A tiny number of career civil servants play a leading role in setting policy within their ministries and other government-linked bureaucracies, leading both an elite corps of senior bureaucrats, and a much larger group of ordinary civil servants. Virtually all of the elite members of this hierarchy are "scholars," which in Singapore parlance means they won competitive, bonded government scholarships—the established route into the country's elite.
Scholars not only lead the Administrative Service, but also the military's officer corps, as well as the executive ranks of statutory boards and government-linked companies (GLCs). Movement between these four groups is fluid, with even the military officers routinely doing stints in the civilian civil service. Together with their political masters, most of whom are also scholars, they make up the software for the entity commonly known as "Singapore Inc."—a labyrinth of GLCs, statutory boards and ministries that own or manage around 60% of Singapore's economy.
The basis of the scholars' mandate to govern is not merely their performance on the job, but also the integrity of the process that selected them. The educational system is designed to cultivate competition, requiring top students to prove themselves every step of the way. Singapore's schools first stream students into elite classes after Primary 3 and 4. They then compete for entry into special secondary schools and junior colleges, before vying for government and government-linked scholarships to attend the most prestigious universities around the world.
These scholarships typically require several years of government service after graduation, and the scholars are drafted into the Administrative Service, the officer corps of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), or the career track of a statutory board or GLC. The government insists that all Singaporeans have equal opportunities to excel in the system, and that everyone who has made it to the top did so purely by academic talent and hard work. Other factors such as gender, socioeconomic background and race supposedly play no more than a marginal role, if they are acknowledged as factors at all.
On the point of race, the Singapore government has long prided itself on having instituted a system of multiracialism that fosters cultural diversity under an umbrella of national unity. This is explicitly supposed to protect the 23% of the population who belong to minority races (mainly ethnic Malays and Indians) from discrimination by the Chinese majority.
But this system conceals several unacknowledged agendas. In our forthcoming book, Constructing Singapore: Elitism, Ethnicity and the Nation-Building Project , Zlatko Skrbiš and I present evidence that the playing field is hardly level. In fact, Singapore's system of promotion disguises and even facilitates tremendous biases against women, the poor and non-Chinese. Singapore's administrative and its political elites—especially the younger ones who have come through school in the last 20 or so years—are not the cream of Singapore's talent as they claim, but are merely a dominant social class, resting on systemic biases to perpetuate regime regeneration based on gender, class and race.
At the peak of the system is the network of prestigious government scholarships. Since independence in 1965, the technique of using government scholarships to recruit cohorts of scholars into the administrative and ruling elite has moved from the periphery of Singaporean society to center stage. Even before independence, a makeshift system of government and Colombo Plan scholarships sent a few outstanding scholars overseas before putting them into government service, including most notably former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong. Yet as late as 1975 this system had contributed only two out of 14 members of Singapore's cabinet. Even by 1985, only four out of 12 cabinet ministers were former government scholars.
By 1994, however, the situation had changed beyond recognition, with eight out of 14 cabinet ministers being ex-scholars, including Prime Minister Goh. By 2005 there were 12 ex-scholars in a Cabinet of 19. Of these, five had been SAF scholars, including Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. A perusal of the upper echelons of the ruling elite taken more broadly tells a similar story. In 1994, 12 of the 17 permanent secretaries were scholars, as were 137 of the 210 in the administrative-officer class of the Administrative Service.
The government scholarship system claims to act as a meritocratic sieve—the just reward for young adults with talent and academic dedication. If there is a racial or other bias in the outcomes, then this can only be the result of the uneven distribution of talent and academic application in the community. As Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong put it when he spoke on national television in May 2005, "We are a multiracial society. We must have tolerance, harmony. … And you must have meritocracy … so everybody feels it is fair…." His father, former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, was making the same point when, in 1989, he told Singapore's Malay community that they "must learn to compete with everyone else" in the education system.
Yet if Singapore's meritocracy is truly a level playing field, as the Lees assert, then the Chinese must be much smarter and harder working than the minority Indians and Malays. Consider the distribution of the top jobs in various arms of the Singapore government service in the 1990s (based on research conducted by Ross Worthington in the early 2000s):
• Of the top 30 GLCs only two ( 6.7%) were chaired by non-Chinese in 1991 (and neither of the non-Chinese was a Malay).
• Of the 38 people who were represented on the most GLC boards in 1998, only two (5.3%) were non-Chinese (and neither of the non-Chinese was a Malay).
• Of the 78 "core people" on statutory boards and GLCs in 1998, seven (9%) were non-Chinese (and one of the non-Chinese was a Malay).
A similar outcome is revealed in the pattern of government scholarships awarded after matriculation from school. Of the 200 winners of Singapore 's most prestigious scholarship, the President's Scholarship, from 1966-2005 only 14 ( 6.4%) were not Chinese. But this was not a consistent proportion throughout the period. If we take 1980 as the divider, we find that there were 10 non-Chinese President's Scholars out of 114 from 1966-80, or 8%, but in the period from 1981-2005 this figure had dropped to four out of 106, or 3.8%. Since independence, the President's Scholarship has been awarded to only one Malay, in 1968. There has been only one non-Chinese President's Scholar in the 18 years from 1987 to 2005 (a boy called Mikail Kalimuddin) and he is actually half Chinese, studied in Chinese schools (Chinese High School and Hwa Chong Junior College), and took the Higher Chinese course as his mother tongue. If we broaden our focus to encompass broader constructions of ethnicity, we find that since independence, the President's Scholarship has been won by only two Muslims (1968 and 2005).
If we consider Singapore's second-ranked scholarship—the Ministry of Defence's Singapore Armed Forces Overseas Scholarship (SAFOS)—we find a comparable pattern. The Ministry of Defence did not respond to my request for a list of recipients of SAF scholarships, but using newspaper accounts and information provided by the Ministry of Defence Scholarship Centre and Public Service Commission Scholarship Centre Web sites, I was able to identify 140 (56%) of the 250 SAFOS winners up to 2005.
Although only indicative, this table clearly suggests the Chinese dominance in SAFOS stakes: 98% of SAFOS winners in this sample were Chinese, and about 2% were non-Chinese (counting Mikail Kalimuddin in 2005 as non-Chinese). Furthermore I found not a single Malay recipient and only one Muslim winner (Mikail Kalimuddin). A similar picture emerges in the lower status Singapore Armed Forces Merit Scholarship winners: 71 ( 25.6%) of 277 (as of late 2005) scholars identified, with 69 (97%) Chinese winners to only two non-Chinese—though there was a Malay recipient in 2004, and one reliable scholar maintains that there have been others.
The position of the non-Chinese in the educational stakes has clearly deteriorated since the beginning of the 1980s. According to the logic of meritocracy, that means the Chinese have been getting smarter, at least compared to the non-Chinese.
Yet the selection of scholars does not depend purely on objective results like exam scores. In the internal processes of awarding scholarships after matriculation results are released, there are plenty of opportunities to exercise subtle forms of discrimination. Extracurricular activities (as recorded in one's school record), "character" and performance in an interview are also considered. This makes the selection process much more subjective than one would expect in a system that claims to be a meritocracy, and it creates ample opportunity for racial and other prejudices to operate with relative freedom.
Is there evidence that such biases operate at this level? Unsurprisingly, the answer to this question is "yes." Take for instance a 2004 promotional supplement in the country's main newspaper used to recruit applicants for scholarships. The advertorial articles accompanying the paid advertisements featured only one non-Chinese scholar (a Malay on a lowly "local" scholarship) amongst 28 Chinese on prestigious overseas scholarships. Even more disturbing for what they reveal about the prejudices of those offering the scholarships were the paid advertisements placed by government ministries, statutory boards and GLCs. Of the 30 scholars who were both prominent and can be racially identified by their photographs or their names without any doubt as to accuracy, every one of them was Chinese. This leaves not a shadow of a doubt that those people granting government and government-linked scholarships presume that the vast majority of high-level winners will be Chinese.
The absence of Malays from the SAFOS scholarships and their near-absence from the SAF Merit Scholarships deserves special mention because this is an extension of discrimination against the admission of Malays into senior and sensitive positions in the SAF that is officially sanctioned. The discrimination against Malays has been discussed in parliament and the media, and is justified by the assertion that the loyalty of Malays cannot be assumed, both because they are Muslim and because they have a racial and ethnic affinity with the Malays in Malaysia and Indonesia . Current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has historically been a vocal defender of this policy.
This discrimination hits Malay men hard, first because it deprives many of promising careers in the army, and second—and more pertinent for our study of the elite—it all but completely excludes potentially high-flying Malays of a chance of entering the scholar class through the SAF. A Chinese woman has a much better chance of winning an SAF scholarship than a Malay man.
Yet even before the scholarship stage, the education system has stacked the deck in favor of Chinese, starting in preschool. Here is the heart of Singapore 's systemic discrimination against non-Chinese. Since the end of the 1970s, the principles of "meritocracy" and "multiracialism" have been subverted by a form of government-driven Chinese chauvinism that has marginalized the minorities. It was not known to the public at the time, but as early as 1978, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had begun referring to Singapore as a "Confucian society" in his dealings with foreign dignitaries. This proved to be the beginning of a shift from his record as a defender of a communally neutral form of multiracialism toward a policy of actively promoting a Chinese-dominated Singapore .
The early outward signs of the Sinicization program were the privileging of Chinese education, Chinese language and selectively chosen "Chinese values" in an overt and successful effort to create a Mandarin- and English-speaking elite who would dominate public life. Two of the most important planks of this campaign were decided in 1979: the annual "Speak Mandarin Campaign" and the decision to preserve and foster a collection of elite Chinese-medium schools, known as Special Assistance Plan ( SAP) schools.
The SAP schools are explicitly designed to have a Chinese ambience, right down to Chinese gardens, windows shaped like plum blossoms, Chinese orchestra and drama, and exchange programs with mainland China and Taiwan. Over the years the children in SAP schools have been given multiple advantages over those in ordinary schools, including exclusive preschool programs and special consideration for preuniversity scholarships.
For instance, in the early 1980s, when there was a serious shortage of graduate English teachers in schools, the Ministry of Education ensured there were enough allocated to SAP schools "to help improve standards of English among the Chinese-medium students, in the hope that they will be able to make it to university"—a target brought closer by the granting of two O-level bonus points exclusively to SAP school students when they applied to enter junior college. By contrast, neither Indians nor Malays received any special help, let alone schools of their own to address their special needs. They were not only left to fend for themselves, but were sometimes subjected to wanton neglect: inadequately trained teachers, substandard facilities and resources and the "knowledge" that they are not as good as the Chinese.
This account of discrimination against non-Chinese might lead the reader to assume that the quarter of Singaporeans who are not Chinese must form a festering and perhaps even revolutionary mass of resentment. Such an assumption would, however, be a long way from the mark. Non-Chinese might be largely excluded from the highest levels of the administrative elite, but just below these rarefied heights there plenty of positions open to intelligent and hardworking non-Chinese—certainly enough to ensure that non-Chinese communities have much to gain by enthusiastically buying into the system, even after the glass ceilings and racial barriers are taken into account . There are many grievances and resentments in these levels of society but the grievances are muted and balanced by an appreciation of the relative comforts and prosperity they enjoy. For most, any tendency to complain is subdued also by knowledge that it could be worse, and the widespread assumption among members of minority communities that it will be if they seriously pursue their grievances. As long as the Singapore system continues to deal such people a satisfactory hand, if not a fair one, it should be able to cope with some quiet rumblings in the ranks.
While this discrimination is not sparking a reaction that threatens the regime in the short term, the resulting injustices are certainly undermining the myth that the regime operates on meritocratic principles. This is worrying in the longer term because this myth, along with the capacity to deliver peace and prosperity, is one of the primary rationales by which Singaporeans reluctantly accept the many unpopular aspects of the regime, such as the lack of freedom and democracy, the intrusion of government into most aspects of private life, the pressure-cooker lifestyle and the high cost of living.
The rhetoric of meritocracy has given Singaporeans the consolation of believing that their ruling elite are the best of the best and can therefore be trusted almost blindly on important matters, even if they are highhanded and lack the common touch. As this illusion gradually falls away—and today it is already heavily undermined—the trust that Singaporeans have for their government is becoming increasingly qualified. It remains to be seen how long the regime can avert the logical consequences of the contradictions between the myth and the reality.
Mr. Barr is a lecturer at the University of Queensland and author of Lee Kuan Yew: The Beliefs Behind the Man (Routledge, 2000) and Cultural Politics and Asian Values: The Tepid War (Routledge, 2002).
October 2006
By Michael D. Barr
The legitimacy of the Singaporean government is predicated on the idea of a meritocratic technocracy. A tiny number of career civil servants play a leading role in setting policy within their ministries and other government-linked bureaucracies, leading both an elite corps of senior bureaucrats, and a much larger group of ordinary civil servants. Virtually all of the elite members of this hierarchy are "scholars," which in Singapore parlance means they won competitive, bonded government scholarships—the established route into the country's elite.
Scholars not only lead the Administrative Service, but also the military's officer corps, as well as the executive ranks of statutory boards and government-linked companies (GLCs). Movement between these four groups is fluid, with even the military officers routinely doing stints in the civilian civil service. Together with their political masters, most of whom are also scholars, they make up the software for the entity commonly known as "Singapore Inc."—a labyrinth of GLCs, statutory boards and ministries that own or manage around 60% of Singapore's economy.
The basis of the scholars' mandate to govern is not merely their performance on the job, but also the integrity of the process that selected them. The educational system is designed to cultivate competition, requiring top students to prove themselves every step of the way. Singapore's schools first stream students into elite classes after Primary 3 and 4. They then compete for entry into special secondary schools and junior colleges, before vying for government and government-linked scholarships to attend the most prestigious universities around the world.
These scholarships typically require several years of government service after graduation, and the scholars are drafted into the Administrative Service, the officer corps of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF), or the career track of a statutory board or GLC. The government insists that all Singaporeans have equal opportunities to excel in the system, and that everyone who has made it to the top did so purely by academic talent and hard work. Other factors such as gender, socioeconomic background and race supposedly play no more than a marginal role, if they are acknowledged as factors at all.
On the point of race, the Singapore government has long prided itself on having instituted a system of multiracialism that fosters cultural diversity under an umbrella of national unity. This is explicitly supposed to protect the 23% of the population who belong to minority races (mainly ethnic Malays and Indians) from discrimination by the Chinese majority.
But this system conceals several unacknowledged agendas. In our forthcoming book, Constructing Singapore: Elitism, Ethnicity and the Nation-Building Project , Zlatko Skrbiš and I present evidence that the playing field is hardly level. In fact, Singapore's system of promotion disguises and even facilitates tremendous biases against women, the poor and non-Chinese. Singapore's administrative and its political elites—especially the younger ones who have come through school in the last 20 or so years—are not the cream of Singapore's talent as they claim, but are merely a dominant social class, resting on systemic biases to perpetuate regime regeneration based on gender, class and race.
At the peak of the system is the network of prestigious government scholarships. Since independence in 1965, the technique of using government scholarships to recruit cohorts of scholars into the administrative and ruling elite has moved from the periphery of Singaporean society to center stage. Even before independence, a makeshift system of government and Colombo Plan scholarships sent a few outstanding scholars overseas before putting them into government service, including most notably former Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong. Yet as late as 1975 this system had contributed only two out of 14 members of Singapore's cabinet. Even by 1985, only four out of 12 cabinet ministers were former government scholars.
By 1994, however, the situation had changed beyond recognition, with eight out of 14 cabinet ministers being ex-scholars, including Prime Minister Goh. By 2005 there were 12 ex-scholars in a Cabinet of 19. Of these, five had been SAF scholars, including Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. A perusal of the upper echelons of the ruling elite taken more broadly tells a similar story. In 1994, 12 of the 17 permanent secretaries were scholars, as were 137 of the 210 in the administrative-officer class of the Administrative Service.
The government scholarship system claims to act as a meritocratic sieve—the just reward for young adults with talent and academic dedication. If there is a racial or other bias in the outcomes, then this can only be the result of the uneven distribution of talent and academic application in the community. As Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong put it when he spoke on national television in May 2005, "We are a multiracial society. We must have tolerance, harmony. … And you must have meritocracy … so everybody feels it is fair…." His father, former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, was making the same point when, in 1989, he told Singapore's Malay community that they "must learn to compete with everyone else" in the education system.
Yet if Singapore's meritocracy is truly a level playing field, as the Lees assert, then the Chinese must be much smarter and harder working than the minority Indians and Malays. Consider the distribution of the top jobs in various arms of the Singapore government service in the 1990s (based on research conducted by Ross Worthington in the early 2000s):
• Of the top 30 GLCs only two ( 6.7%) were chaired by non-Chinese in 1991 (and neither of the non-Chinese was a Malay).
• Of the 38 people who were represented on the most GLC boards in 1998, only two (5.3%) were non-Chinese (and neither of the non-Chinese was a Malay).
• Of the 78 "core people" on statutory boards and GLCs in 1998, seven (9%) were non-Chinese (and one of the non-Chinese was a Malay).
A similar outcome is revealed in the pattern of government scholarships awarded after matriculation from school. Of the 200 winners of Singapore 's most prestigious scholarship, the President's Scholarship, from 1966-2005 only 14 ( 6.4%) were not Chinese. But this was not a consistent proportion throughout the period. If we take 1980 as the divider, we find that there were 10 non-Chinese President's Scholars out of 114 from 1966-80, or 8%, but in the period from 1981-2005 this figure had dropped to four out of 106, or 3.8%. Since independence, the President's Scholarship has been awarded to only one Malay, in 1968. There has been only one non-Chinese President's Scholar in the 18 years from 1987 to 2005 (a boy called Mikail Kalimuddin) and he is actually half Chinese, studied in Chinese schools (Chinese High School and Hwa Chong Junior College), and took the Higher Chinese course as his mother tongue. If we broaden our focus to encompass broader constructions of ethnicity, we find that since independence, the President's Scholarship has been won by only two Muslims (1968 and 2005).
If we consider Singapore's second-ranked scholarship—the Ministry of Defence's Singapore Armed Forces Overseas Scholarship (SAFOS)—we find a comparable pattern. The Ministry of Defence did not respond to my request for a list of recipients of SAF scholarships, but using newspaper accounts and information provided by the Ministry of Defence Scholarship Centre and Public Service Commission Scholarship Centre Web sites, I was able to identify 140 (56%) of the 250 SAFOS winners up to 2005.
Although only indicative, this table clearly suggests the Chinese dominance in SAFOS stakes: 98% of SAFOS winners in this sample were Chinese, and about 2% were non-Chinese (counting Mikail Kalimuddin in 2005 as non-Chinese). Furthermore I found not a single Malay recipient and only one Muslim winner (Mikail Kalimuddin). A similar picture emerges in the lower status Singapore Armed Forces Merit Scholarship winners: 71 ( 25.6%) of 277 (as of late 2005) scholars identified, with 69 (97%) Chinese winners to only two non-Chinese—though there was a Malay recipient in 2004, and one reliable scholar maintains that there have been others.
The position of the non-Chinese in the educational stakes has clearly deteriorated since the beginning of the 1980s. According to the logic of meritocracy, that means the Chinese have been getting smarter, at least compared to the non-Chinese.
Yet the selection of scholars does not depend purely on objective results like exam scores. In the internal processes of awarding scholarships after matriculation results are released, there are plenty of opportunities to exercise subtle forms of discrimination. Extracurricular activities (as recorded in one's school record), "character" and performance in an interview are also considered. This makes the selection process much more subjective than one would expect in a system that claims to be a meritocracy, and it creates ample opportunity for racial and other prejudices to operate with relative freedom.
Is there evidence that such biases operate at this level? Unsurprisingly, the answer to this question is "yes." Take for instance a 2004 promotional supplement in the country's main newspaper used to recruit applicants for scholarships. The advertorial articles accompanying the paid advertisements featured only one non-Chinese scholar (a Malay on a lowly "local" scholarship) amongst 28 Chinese on prestigious overseas scholarships. Even more disturbing for what they reveal about the prejudices of those offering the scholarships were the paid advertisements placed by government ministries, statutory boards and GLCs. Of the 30 scholars who were both prominent and can be racially identified by their photographs or their names without any doubt as to accuracy, every one of them was Chinese. This leaves not a shadow of a doubt that those people granting government and government-linked scholarships presume that the vast majority of high-level winners will be Chinese.
The absence of Malays from the SAFOS scholarships and their near-absence from the SAF Merit Scholarships deserves special mention because this is an extension of discrimination against the admission of Malays into senior and sensitive positions in the SAF that is officially sanctioned. The discrimination against Malays has been discussed in parliament and the media, and is justified by the assertion that the loyalty of Malays cannot be assumed, both because they are Muslim and because they have a racial and ethnic affinity with the Malays in Malaysia and Indonesia . Current Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has historically been a vocal defender of this policy.
This discrimination hits Malay men hard, first because it deprives many of promising careers in the army, and second—and more pertinent for our study of the elite—it all but completely excludes potentially high-flying Malays of a chance of entering the scholar class through the SAF. A Chinese woman has a much better chance of winning an SAF scholarship than a Malay man.
Yet even before the scholarship stage, the education system has stacked the deck in favor of Chinese, starting in preschool. Here is the heart of Singapore 's systemic discrimination against non-Chinese. Since the end of the 1970s, the principles of "meritocracy" and "multiracialism" have been subverted by a form of government-driven Chinese chauvinism that has marginalized the minorities. It was not known to the public at the time, but as early as 1978, then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had begun referring to Singapore as a "Confucian society" in his dealings with foreign dignitaries. This proved to be the beginning of a shift from his record as a defender of a communally neutral form of multiracialism toward a policy of actively promoting a Chinese-dominated Singapore .
The early outward signs of the Sinicization program were the privileging of Chinese education, Chinese language and selectively chosen "Chinese values" in an overt and successful effort to create a Mandarin- and English-speaking elite who would dominate public life. Two of the most important planks of this campaign were decided in 1979: the annual "Speak Mandarin Campaign" and the decision to preserve and foster a collection of elite Chinese-medium schools, known as Special Assistance Plan ( SAP) schools.
The SAP schools are explicitly designed to have a Chinese ambience, right down to Chinese gardens, windows shaped like plum blossoms, Chinese orchestra and drama, and exchange programs with mainland China and Taiwan. Over the years the children in SAP schools have been given multiple advantages over those in ordinary schools, including exclusive preschool programs and special consideration for preuniversity scholarships.
For instance, in the early 1980s, when there was a serious shortage of graduate English teachers in schools, the Ministry of Education ensured there were enough allocated to SAP schools "to help improve standards of English among the Chinese-medium students, in the hope that they will be able to make it to university"—a target brought closer by the granting of two O-level bonus points exclusively to SAP school students when they applied to enter junior college. By contrast, neither Indians nor Malays received any special help, let alone schools of their own to address their special needs. They were not only left to fend for themselves, but were sometimes subjected to wanton neglect: inadequately trained teachers, substandard facilities and resources and the "knowledge" that they are not as good as the Chinese.
This account of discrimination against non-Chinese might lead the reader to assume that the quarter of Singaporeans who are not Chinese must form a festering and perhaps even revolutionary mass of resentment. Such an assumption would, however, be a long way from the mark. Non-Chinese might be largely excluded from the highest levels of the administrative elite, but just below these rarefied heights there plenty of positions open to intelligent and hardworking non-Chinese—certainly enough to ensure that non-Chinese communities have much to gain by enthusiastically buying into the system, even after the glass ceilings and racial barriers are taken into account . There are many grievances and resentments in these levels of society but the grievances are muted and balanced by an appreciation of the relative comforts and prosperity they enjoy. For most, any tendency to complain is subdued also by knowledge that it could be worse, and the widespread assumption among members of minority communities that it will be if they seriously pursue their grievances. As long as the Singapore system continues to deal such people a satisfactory hand, if not a fair one, it should be able to cope with some quiet rumblings in the ranks.
While this discrimination is not sparking a reaction that threatens the regime in the short term, the resulting injustices are certainly undermining the myth that the regime operates on meritocratic principles. This is worrying in the longer term because this myth, along with the capacity to deliver peace and prosperity, is one of the primary rationales by which Singaporeans reluctantly accept the many unpopular aspects of the regime, such as the lack of freedom and democracy, the intrusion of government into most aspects of private life, the pressure-cooker lifestyle and the high cost of living.
The rhetoric of meritocracy has given Singaporeans the consolation of believing that their ruling elite are the best of the best and can therefore be trusted almost blindly on important matters, even if they are highhanded and lack the common touch. As this illusion gradually falls away—and today it is already heavily undermined—the trust that Singaporeans have for their government is becoming increasingly qualified. It remains to be seen how long the regime can avert the logical consequences of the contradictions between the myth and the reality.
Mr. Barr is a lecturer at the University of Queensland and author of Lee Kuan Yew: The Beliefs Behind the Man (Routledge, 2000) and Cultural Politics and Asian Values: The Tepid War (Routledge, 2002).
For unity!
I support Khoo Kay Khim's idea for the Chinese and Indian in Malaysia to give-up their mother tongue education and integrate into a one school education system.
I do think that the current system does not breed unity among the different races in Malaysia. I have come across many Chinese and Indian educated students that could not converse in proper Malay or English. When you can't communicate, unity is almost impossible.
No matter what the Constitution says about it, I don't think the current system is the best for this country. We have been independent for almost 51 years, and we are still far away from unity among the different races.
Unless you have a better idea of how we can create unity, do not throw away the idea at first thought!
I do think that the current system does not breed unity among the different races in Malaysia. I have come across many Chinese and Indian educated students that could not converse in proper Malay or English. When you can't communicate, unity is almost impossible.
No matter what the Constitution says about it, I don't think the current system is the best for this country. We have been independent for almost 51 years, and we are still far away from unity among the different races.
Unless you have a better idea of how we can create unity, do not throw away the idea at first thought!
Monday, September 8, 2008
Ahmad, you are an idiot!
As a Malay, I am ashamed by the acts of Datuk Ahmad Ismail, the Bukit Bendera UMNO division head, and his supporters. If all Malaysian leaders are like him, this country is heading towards destruction.
Read the following report by Malaysiakini, on how he handled his press conference today.
Ahmad: Saya sanggup hadapi risiko
Demi martabat Melayu, ketua Umno Bukit Bendera, Datuk Ahmad Ismail berkata beliau tidak akan memohon maaf dan sanggup menghadapi risikonya.
Bercakap dalam sidang akhbar hari ini, beliau berkata, ini bukan soal parti tetapi adalah soal maruah dan martabat Melayu serta agama Islam.
"Kami bersyukur YAB Pak Lah (Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi) faham tentang isu tersebut dan ini boleh kita nilai sendiri dari kenyataan akhbar yang dibuat oleh beliau sebaik sahaja selesai mesyuarat Badan Perhubungan Umno Negeri Pulau Pinang.
"Pak Lah telah meminta saya untuk membuat satu lagi sidang akhbar - maka inilah kita adakan sidang akhbar pada hari ini," kata Ahmad.
Beliau juga berterima kasih kepada badan perhubungan Umno negeri yang telah membuat keputusan melantik peguam bagi mengkaji dan seterusnya mengambil tindakan menyaman wartawan yang didakwa telah sengaja menjadikan isu tersebut begitu sensasi dan kontroversi.
Katanya, tindakan itu juga akan turut diambil terhadap akhbar Sin Chew Daily yang didakwanya sengaja menerbitkan laporan yang berbau perkauman.
"Saya telah difahamkan juga bahawa ada akhbar yang telah melaporkan bahawa kononnya saya, di dalam sidang akhbar saya pada 5 September yang lalu, kononnya saya telah menafikan yang saya ada menyatakan bahawa "orang-orang Cina adalah menumpang di negara ini".
"Ini adalah satu permainan jahat yang mahu merosakkan kredibiliti saya," katanya.
Ahmad juga mendakwa bahawa beberapa pemimpin Gerakan sengaja mengambil kesempatan dan telah mengembar-gemburkan fakta menjadi isu-isu tersebut lebih nampak perkauman.
Beliau mendakwa, mereka berbuat demikian "untuk menyembunyikan kelemahan diri sendiri dan cuba menjadikan isu ini sebagai "kambing hitam" dan telah "cuba lari dari hakikat bahawa orang Cina sudah tidak lagi menyokong mereka".
Dakwanya lagi, keadan menjadi gawat lagi bila pemangku Presiden Gerakan, Tan Sri Koo Tsu Koon dan beberapa pemimpin Gerakan serta pemimpin Cina sengaja membuat kenyataan-kenyataan yang melambangkan perkauman.
Sidang akhbar tersebut, yang berlangsung di ibupejabat Umno Pulau Pinang petang tadi berakhir dengan laungan ‘Hidup Melayu' oleh kira-kira 50 pemimpin Umno.
Sebaik sahaja sidang akhbar itu tamat, bekas ahli badan perhubungan Umno negeri, Zainol Abidin Hashim, dengan bantuan rakan-rakannya telah menurunkan gambar Dr Koh dari dinding ibupejabat Umno tersebut.
Zainol kemudiannya mengeluarkan gambar Dr Koh dari bingkai gambar dan mengoyaknya.
Jumaat lalu, Ahmad telah mengadakan sidang akhbar di mana beliau menegaskan tidak akan memohon atas atas kenyataannya itu.
Pendirian beliau itu disokong oleh kesemua 13 ketua bahagian Umno Pulau Pinang.
Sementara itu, dalam reaksinya, AbduIlah dan Timbalannya, Datuk Seri Najib Razak dijangka mengadakan pertemuan dengan Ahmad esok. Dipercayai tindakan akan diambil terhadap ketua Umno Bukit Bendera itu.
Read the following report by Malaysiakini, on how he handled his press conference today.
Ahmad: Saya sanggup hadapi risiko
Demi martabat Melayu, ketua Umno Bukit Bendera, Datuk Ahmad Ismail berkata beliau tidak akan memohon maaf dan sanggup menghadapi risikonya.
Bercakap dalam sidang akhbar hari ini, beliau berkata, ini bukan soal parti tetapi adalah soal maruah dan martabat Melayu serta agama Islam.
"Kami bersyukur YAB Pak Lah (Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi) faham tentang isu tersebut dan ini boleh kita nilai sendiri dari kenyataan akhbar yang dibuat oleh beliau sebaik sahaja selesai mesyuarat Badan Perhubungan Umno Negeri Pulau Pinang.
"Pak Lah telah meminta saya untuk membuat satu lagi sidang akhbar - maka inilah kita adakan sidang akhbar pada hari ini," kata Ahmad.
Beliau juga berterima kasih kepada badan perhubungan Umno negeri yang telah membuat keputusan melantik peguam bagi mengkaji dan seterusnya mengambil tindakan menyaman wartawan yang didakwa telah sengaja menjadikan isu tersebut begitu sensasi dan kontroversi.
Katanya, tindakan itu juga akan turut diambil terhadap akhbar Sin Chew Daily yang didakwanya sengaja menerbitkan laporan yang berbau perkauman.
"Saya telah difahamkan juga bahawa ada akhbar yang telah melaporkan bahawa kononnya saya, di dalam sidang akhbar saya pada 5 September yang lalu, kononnya saya telah menafikan yang saya ada menyatakan bahawa "orang-orang Cina adalah menumpang di negara ini".
"Ini adalah satu permainan jahat yang mahu merosakkan kredibiliti saya," katanya.
Ahmad juga mendakwa bahawa beberapa pemimpin Gerakan sengaja mengambil kesempatan dan telah mengembar-gemburkan fakta menjadi isu-isu tersebut lebih nampak perkauman.
Beliau mendakwa, mereka berbuat demikian "untuk menyembunyikan kelemahan diri sendiri dan cuba menjadikan isu ini sebagai "kambing hitam" dan telah "cuba lari dari hakikat bahawa orang Cina sudah tidak lagi menyokong mereka".
Dakwanya lagi, keadan menjadi gawat lagi bila pemangku Presiden Gerakan, Tan Sri Koo Tsu Koon dan beberapa pemimpin Gerakan serta pemimpin Cina sengaja membuat kenyataan-kenyataan yang melambangkan perkauman.
Sidang akhbar tersebut, yang berlangsung di ibupejabat Umno Pulau Pinang petang tadi berakhir dengan laungan ‘Hidup Melayu' oleh kira-kira 50 pemimpin Umno.
Sebaik sahaja sidang akhbar itu tamat, bekas ahli badan perhubungan Umno negeri, Zainol Abidin Hashim, dengan bantuan rakan-rakannya telah menurunkan gambar Dr Koh dari dinding ibupejabat Umno tersebut.
Zainol kemudiannya mengeluarkan gambar Dr Koh dari bingkai gambar dan mengoyaknya.
Jumaat lalu, Ahmad telah mengadakan sidang akhbar di mana beliau menegaskan tidak akan memohon atas atas kenyataannya itu.
Pendirian beliau itu disokong oleh kesemua 13 ketua bahagian Umno Pulau Pinang.
Sementara itu, dalam reaksinya, AbduIlah dan Timbalannya, Datuk Seri Najib Razak dijangka mengadakan pertemuan dengan Ahmad esok. Dipercayai tindakan akan diambil terhadap ketua Umno Bukit Bendera itu.
Thursday, July 3, 2008
What a day!
I'm sure the Malaysian newspaper editors wish they have a bigger front page for tomorrow's (Friday) edition. There are too many interesting news for them to report on, and all of them are worthy candidate for the main headline!
1. News on P. Balasubramaniam statutory declaration, in which the Deputy Prime Minister is implicated in the Altantuya case. Najib has strongly denied the accusation. So, it is Najib's words against Balasubramaniam's words. Who's right?
2. News on Najib admitting that Saiful Bukhari had actually met him before he went to report the sodomy case to the police. A few days ago, he mentioned that Saiful had met his aide, Khairil Anas, for scholarship. How did he fail to mention that Saiful had actually met him too??
3. News on the Bursa Malaysia shutdown. How did this happen? In today's advanced market, they should have a back-up system which could be use whenever the main system failed. This shutdown has led to numerous rumours, including one that says the government purposely shut the market in order to stop foreign investors from fleeing the country.
4. News on the joint police and military exercise. What is the best way to calm the rakyat on this political instability? The government feels the best way is to put the military on the street. Instead of giving comfort, the opposite happens. The rakyat are quite agitated. Some even feel that the government is preparing for a darurat, which is a very very bad news for Malaysia.
Which one would be your headline??
1. News on P. Balasubramaniam statutory declaration, in which the Deputy Prime Minister is implicated in the Altantuya case. Najib has strongly denied the accusation. So, it is Najib's words against Balasubramaniam's words. Who's right?
2. News on Najib admitting that Saiful Bukhari had actually met him before he went to report the sodomy case to the police. A few days ago, he mentioned that Saiful had met his aide, Khairil Anas, for scholarship. How did he fail to mention that Saiful had actually met him too??
3. News on the Bursa Malaysia shutdown. How did this happen? In today's advanced market, they should have a back-up system which could be use whenever the main system failed. This shutdown has led to numerous rumours, including one that says the government purposely shut the market in order to stop foreign investors from fleeing the country.
4. News on the joint police and military exercise. What is the best way to calm the rakyat on this political instability? The government feels the best way is to put the military on the street. Instead of giving comfort, the opposite happens. The rakyat are quite agitated. Some even feel that the government is preparing for a darurat, which is a very very bad news for Malaysia.
Which one would be your headline??
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